We examine the returns from owning cows and buffaloes in rural India. We estimate that when valuing labor at market wages, households earn large, negative average returns from holding cows and buffaloes, at negative 64% and negative 39% respectively. This puzzle is mostly explained if we value the household's own labor at zero (a stark assumption), in which case estimated average returns for cows is negative 6% and positive 13% for buffaloes. Why do households continue to invest in livestock if economic returns are negative, or are these estimates wrong? We discuss potential explanations, including labor market failures, for why livestock investments may persist.
I. Introduction
Despite the importance of livestock as an asset class in developing countries, we know less than we should about their economic returns. Understanding the profitability of these common household investments is important for several reasons.
First, if these types of investments are profitable, then it suggests that low take-up of formal financial savings products may in part be driven by profitable risk-adjusted returns to informal assets. If this is the case, then programs which encourage households to use formal sector savings are unlikely to succeed unless they provide higher, safer, or more flexible returns than those available on livestock assets. Second, estimates of the returns to livestock can inform lenders about whether there are profitable projects for them to finance. As pointed out in de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009a) while the (albeit limited) demand for high interest rate loans suggests that some proportion of households earn high returns on investments such as dairy animals, it is difficult to estimate the average return for non-borrowing households without data on profitability. Third, understanding the returns to livestock can help us learn more about labor market failures. Households will only choose to spend time caring for livestock if the returns on livestock are greater than their opportunity cost of labor; if returns on livestock are found to be low, then this suggests that households' labor market opportunities (both formal, informal, and household production) are poor. Fourth, to the extent that some development organizations provide grants of livestock to alleviate poverty 1 , this analysis provides plausible estimates of potential impact, or at least lower bounds (many such grant programs provide services alongside the grant). Randomized trials evaluating the impact of asset transfers on income and consumption have found considerable success in several instances (Innovations for Poverty Action 2013), but studies to date have evaluated bundled interventions which include the provision of savings accounts, health trainings, and consumption support as well as livestock grants, rendering it difficult to isolate the returns to livestock specifically. 2 We use newly collected animal level survey data from northern India to estimate the returns to owning dairy cows and buffaloes. We are motivated to study dairy animals in India because of their importance as an asset among India's rural poor. India holds more than a sixth of the world's population and over one quarter of the world's estimated cattle population. The Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), a nationally representative survey of rural India, found that 45 percent of rural Indian households owned at least one cow or buffalo in 1999, and on average those who have a cow or buffalo have an adult female. Our survey data provides information on all the major inputs in the milk production function including the value of the animal, fodder costs, veterinary costs, and lactation periods, as well as detailed data on animal outputs including milk, calves, and dung. We estimate annual returns to owning a dairy animal based on estimates of accounting profits (excluding the opportunity cost of labor) and economic profits (including the opportunity cost of labor, but not including the opportunity cost of capital).
Our main finding is that, on average, households earn negative returns on their investments in cows and buffaloes if labor is valued at market wages: we estimate average returns of negative 64% and negative 39% for cows and buffaloes respectively. If we value the household's own labor at zero, estimated average returns increase, to negative 6% for cows and positive 13% for buffaloes. We conduct a variety of robustness checks to consider measurement error in the value of inputs and outputs as an explanation for our estimated low returns. For example, we replace self-reported values of fodder with estimated costs from a fodder production company in India and find that estimated returns still appear to be low. We also conduct sensitivity analyses by adjusting the data for outliers, but still find low estimated returns.
Estimates of low or negative returns present a puzzle similar to the "Edible Arrangements" satirical quote at the opening of this paper: if cows and buffaloes earn such low, even negative, economic returns, why would rural Indian households continue to invest in them? The second part of our paper puts forward theories as to why households might persist in investing in cows and buffaloes despite their low returns. While the data at hand do not allow us to distinguish conclusively between these various explanations, we present some evidence to suggest that some explanations appear more plausible than others.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and methods for calculating the returns to cows and buffalos. Section III presents the estimates. Section IV discusses potential explanations for why so many estimates are zero or negative, and Section V discusses further research questions and policy implications.
II. Data and Methods

Data
The data were collected from the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Household Survey, also used in Anagol The districts were split into two geographic regions, a smaller region called the "Ajbapur" area and a larger region called the "non-Ajbapur area". The distinction was relevant for this survey as
Ajbapur is the location of a large sugarcane mill, and the survey collected detailed data on water trading among sugarcane farmers. A complete list of villages in the two districts was obtained from the Indian census of 2000, and seventy villages were randomly selected (with probability proportional to size), including twenty from the Ajbapur area and fifty from the non-Ajbapur area. Within each village in Ajbapur, we randomly sampled 10 households from the full village, and an additional 20 households among all households that were identified as selling water in the village in a household listing survey. 3 In non-Ajbapur villages we sampled 20 households randomly from the full village and two households that were identified as jointly owning a borewell in the village. 4, 5 All households in the survey, including the water-seller respondents, were asked the same set of questions regarding their dairying behavior. 3 We sampled a greater number of households that traded water within the Ajbapur area because the survey was also used to study the water trading behavior of households that lived near the sugarcane mill in Ajbapur. 4 Due to unsatisfactory performance by the initially hired data entry firm, we switched data entry firms and reentered all of the data. In the process of transferring the hard copies of surveys from the first data entry firm to the second, 11 percent of the original surveys were lost. Among the non-Ajbapur villages, we received 967 of the expected 1100 surveys. Three villages in the original non-Ajbapur sample frame were lost. Among the Ajbapur villages, we received 546 of the expected 585 surveys. We received surveys from all of the villages that were originally included in the Ajbapur sample frame. Overall, we are missing data from eleven percent of households in the original sample frame. 5 The survey collected a larger number of observations from water sellers in the Ajbapur to study water trading amongst those living close to a sugarcane mill. In the non-Ajbapur area, the survey collected information on two households that jointly owned borewells as baseline information for a potential field experiment on joint ownership of borewells.
The survey asked detailed questions about livestock, farming practices, land holdings, assets, household consumption and income history, savings, borrowing, and shocks. The "animal details" section of the questionnaire (Section E) focused on one randomly chosen dairy animal owned by the household, asking if the animal was a cow or buffalo and other details about the animal. 6 For an adult female dairy animal, the survey asked how many liters of milk were given at different stages of the lactation period, including immediately after giving birth to a calf, three months after giving birth, six months after giving birth and nine months after giving birth. The survey also asked about the number of insemination attempts it would take to impregnate the animal, the number and value of male and female calves born to the animal, the number of dung cakes the animal produces per day, the number of times the animal had visited the veterinarian in the 12 months preceding the survey, the costs associated with these visits, and the costs of feeding the animal (including both purchased and home-produced fodder).
Estimating the Rate of Return
Our equation for the annual rate of return on a cow or buffalo is
Rate of return (ROR) = (P t − P t−1 + Profit t ) P t−1 where P t is the price at end of year, P t−1 is the price at the beginning of the year, and Profit t is the profit generated by the animal over the year. We estimate the term P t − P t−1 as the average change in the value of animals that go from the animal's current age in our data to their current age plus one year. We estimate the flow profits (Profit t ) as the revenues from milk, calves and dung minus fodder, veterinary, and insemination costs.
The first calculation we need to perform to estimate the annual return to a dairy animal is how many lactations, on average, the typical animal has per year. Our survey asked households how many calves they expected the sampled dairy animal to have in the rest of its life (having a calf is a necessary and sufficient condition for having a lactation). We take this number and divide it by 6 The dairy section of the questionnaire (Section D) asked if the household owned any female cows/buffaloes; if so, how many cows/buffaloes the household owned. For each cow or buffalo owned, households were asked to record, beginning with the most valuable cow/buffalo and then proceeding in order of declining value, the animal's breed, and what its selling price would be if the household wanted to sell the animal. The enumerator was then instructed to administer the detailed animal questions (Section E) regarding the animal in this list whose ID number appeared first on a sticker (unique to each survey) which contained a randomized ordering of all the Animal IDs.
an estimate of the number of years we expect the sampled animal to live. 7 For cows, the average number of calves expected per year is 0.89, and for buffaloes the average number of calves expected per year is 0.97. For simplicity, we assume that cows and buffaloes in our sample will produce one calf, and thus have one lactation period, per year.
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The annual input and output variables used in the calculations are as follows.
Inputs
Fodder costs:
Dairy animals typically eat more during the time when they are giving milk versus the time when they are dry. For each cow or buffalo in our survey, we have separate estimates for the cost of feeding the animal when it is milking versus dry. We combine this information with previous estimates on the average amount of time Indian dairy animals spend dry versus milking per year. Dry periods for cows and buffaloes in India are estimated
to be approximately 160 days per year (Anagol 2010 ). Since we are estimating returns over a one-year period, assuming a 365-day year implies that milking periods are 205 days per year (roughly seven months). The survey asked how many months the animal will give milk after it gives birth. The average response was seven months (but can go up to 10 months for some animals), which is consistent with the estimated 205 days we use to estimate annual fodder costs. To validate the fodder costs reported by our respondents, we also conduct a robustness test using a different measure of fodder costs developed by the Kisan Fodder Company, a livestock enterprise based in Uttar Pradesh. Kisan provides an estimate of the amount of fodder necessary for an animal to eat to produce a certain amount of milk. 9 We combine their estimates with our data on the amount of milk the animal gives per lactation to estimate the cost of feeding the animal during the year. 7 We estimate a dairy's animals expected years to live as follows. We first take the observed age distribution of cows above the age of six years old in our sample, and estimate the probability of death at each age based on the proportionate decrease in the number of cows at each age level. We also assume that cows or buffaloes that reach the age of 15 will die in that year, as this is the oldest observed animal we see in our data. Using this estimate of a mortality table for cows, we can estimate an animal's expected to years to live conditional on obtaining its current age. For animals less than six years of age, we assume that they will make it to age six with probability one. We make this assumption as our data contains few observations of animals less than six years old so our estimated mortality table is not accurate for the younger ages. 8 The assumption of one calf per year is likely an over-estimate, as even dairy cows in the US typically do not birth more than one calf per year on average. 9 The exact mapping that Kisan Fodder uses between milk production and fodder consumption is described in the Appendix to this paper.
Appreciation and depreciation of dairy animal value:
Consider an animal in our sample that was three years old at the time of our survey. To estimate the change in the value of this capital asset (i.e. P t − P t−1 ) we assume that this animal's value will change, on average, the same as the difference in value of all four-year-old animals and all three-year-old animals in our sample.
Veterinary costs (costs of examinations and procedures during visits to a veterinarian):
We have a direct survey question that asks how much the household spent on veterinary costs for the animal over the past year.
Cost of insemination:
This is determined by the number of insemination attempts needed to impregnate the animal multiplied by the cost for one insemination. 78 percent of animals where we collected detailed information were inseminated using a breeding bull, and 13 percent were inseminated using artificial insemination, and 9 percent were inseminated using both methods (the households tried different methods). The survey did not include a direct question on the cost of using natural insemination, so we make the conservative assumption that natural insemination is as expensive as artificial insemination. 10 Insemination services are typically provided by either a government veterinary hospital or an NGO in our survey villages. Our village level survey suggests that the average cost of one insemination by a government hospital was 66 rupees. For an NGO, the corresponding figure was 70 rupees. As we are unable to distinguish between the services provided by the two providers, we assume the price is the average of the two, 68 rupees. Sensitivity analysis shows that the results are unchanged regardless of whether a price of 66, 68 or 70 rupees is used.
Labor costs:
Our survey asked about the number of hours spent caring for animals per day in the household where the sampled animal lives. We estimate the cost per hour of this labor as follows. We observe that children and adults (both men and women) in the household are generally equally responsible for the care of the animal. 11 According to our village level survey, the daily wage rate for an adult (man or woman) is 60 rupees, and the child labor wage rate per day is 25 rupees. In our baseline estimates we thus assume that the cost of 10 In reality we suspect that natural insemination is cheaper than artificial insemination, as local bulls are typically maintained in villages for insemination purposes. Nonetheless, given the low price of insemination in general it is unlikely our results are driven by measurement error in insemination costs. 11 We do not know which household members take care of these particular animals. However, the survey asks whether a household has owned any female cows or buffaloes in the past five years and which members of this household are responsible for dairy animals. According to the data, it is common practice for household members (adult males and females as well as children) to share the responsibility of taking care of their cows and buffaloes.
taking care of the dairy animal is 42.5 rupees per day. Assuming an eight hour work day, this
gives an hourly labor cost of approximately 5 rupees. 12 The average number of hours spent to tend the animal is 3.5 hours (with a standard deviation of 1.06), with the 25th percentile being 3 hours and the 75th percentile 4 hours. An important point to note is the possibility of multi-tasking when tending the animal. It is possible that the animal is taken out to pasture while the caretaker is doing something else (for example, working on the farm, doing something in the neighboring plot, etc.). Our survey did not ask any direct questions about multi-tasking so we cannot directly assess its importance. We account for the fact that multitasking might reduce the effective cost of labor by including return calculations where we assume the value of labor is zero (our "accounting" rates of return).
Outputs
Value of milk:
Our survey asked the following questions to determine the value of milk produced by the animal per lactation. We asked for the number of liters of milk produced during the first three months after birth, from three to six months, from six to nine months, and from nine to ten months. We asked for potentially differing amounts of milk production based on months since birthing, as cows and buffaloes typically give the most milk around four to five months after giving birth and then reduce milk production as the calf switches to solid foods. We multiply the liters per day estimate by the household's response to a survey question on the average price of milk produced by the household.
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The value of milk produced by the cow/buffalo when it is dry is assumed to be zero.
Value of calves:
Given that we estimate dairy cows and buffaloes have approximately one lactation per year, this implies that they would produce one calf per year (on average).
For each cow and buffalo in our sample, the survey asked the respondent to estimate what a new calf of this particular animal would be worth (separately for male and female calves) at the time of birth. Given that male and female calves are equally likely to be born, we take the average value of male and female calves as the expected value of a calf during its first year.
12 According to The Times of India (2011), the average for the OECD nations is 8 hours a day, slightly below the figure for Indians at 8.1 hours (486 minutes). Accessed online at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-13/india-business/29413474_1_oecd-countries-cooking-indians-work 13 The survey did not ask for specific price per liter estimates for each animal in the household as fieldwork during piloting suggested there was not substantial variation in the price per liter of milk within households.
Value of dung cakes
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: Our survey asked the respondent to estimate the number of dung cakes the animal produces per day. We combine this information with the estimated value of a dung cake as provided in the village survey (1 rupee per dung cake), to estimate the value of dung cakes produced per year.
Value of adult animal:
Our survey asked what the value of the animal would be if the animal were sold in the near future. This is the value we use to estimate P t .
III. Estimates
The sample includes 300 cows and 384 buffaloes. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the sources of value and expenditure. Right after giving birth to a calf, a buffalo produces three and a half liters of milk per day, on average, and a cow produces three liters of milk per day, on average. Between three to six months after giving birth, the quantity of milk produced increases by half a liter for buffaloes and one-quarter of a liter for cows. Milk yield then declines between six to nine months after giving birth: buffaloes give three liters per day, and cows two liters per day. After this period, the animals get closer to becoming completely dry, with buffaloes yielding one liter per day and cows one-half of a liter per day. The trend in milk yield over the lactation is illustrated in a bar chart shown in Figure 1 and the distribution of milk produced per day is shown in Figure 2 . Table 1 shows that there are no differences between cows and buffaloes with regard to the remaining inputs: labor hours, veterinary expenses, and insemination expenses. A typical animal visits the veterinarian once per year. Four labor hours are spent each day tending the animal; and it takes two insemination attempts to get it pregnant during a 12-month cycle. On average, the animal produces four units of dung cakes per day.
Our estimates of the accounting profits to owning a cow or buffalo (i.e., labor valued at zero) are presented in Table 2a -d. In Table 2a the top row shows the mean values of inputs and outputs, total costs, profits, and rates of return for the cows whose rates of return fall within the top 14 Cow dung can be used in several ways. First, dung cakes are a source of domestic fuel in many rural households in India (Aggarwal and Singh 1984) . Second, dung is often used as agricultural fertilizer (Aggarwal and Singh 1984) . Third, due to its insect repellent properties for some types of insects (such as mosquitoes), dung is used to line the floor and walls of buildings (Mandavgane, Pattalwar, and Kalambe 2005) . Dung is therefore important, allowing households to save money that would otherwise be spent on alternatives such as firewood, fertilizer and insecticides.
twenty percent of rates of return overall; the next row shows the mean values of inputs and outputs for cows whose rates of return fall between the 20 th and 40 th percentile. The second panel shows the same calculations for our sample of buffaloes.
The results in Tables 2a show negative accounting profits (-6%) for cows, and positive profits (13%) for buffaloes. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the difference between the two means is statistically significant at 1%. The tables also show the distribution of returns for both cow and buffaloes. There is substantial variation in the calculated rates of return across our groups, and thus it is important to determine to what extent our mean estimates of rates of return are influenced by outliers.
The quintile based mean estimates show that the adult value of animals (Column C) and value of fodder costs (Column F) have the most substantial amount of variation across the quintiles and therefore may be driving a lot of the variation in rates of return. We now evaluate how sensitive our mean estimates of rates of return are to outliers in the adult value of animals and fodder costs. Table 2b presents estimates of the accounting returns to owning cows and buffaloes assuming all cows/buffaloes had an adult value equal to the median adult value in the data. Replacing a cow's/ buffalo's survey-based adult value with the median value in the data mechanically removes any outliers on adult values. The results remain similar for cows (the rate of return is -9% on average), but higher returns are obtained for buffaloes (about 20% on average). Table 2c examines the sensitivity of our mean estimate of returns to fodder costs. This table is the same as Table 2a , except now for each animal we replace the household's estimate of fodder costs with our estimate of the animal's fodder cost based on the amounts of fodder recommended by the Kisan fodder company. Given that the Kisan fodder company uses a simple linear formula for fodder based on the liters of milk an animal gives, this will mechanically remove any major outliers in the household's estimates of fodder costs. We find that, overall, cows earn an average rate of return of 15% per year and buffaloes earn an average return of 5% per year. Table 2d reports our estimates after both adjusting for outliers in the mean values of animals (as in Table 2b ) as well as adjusting for outliers in fodder costs (as in Table 2c ). After removing these outliers, we find that cows have an average return of 21% per year and buffaloes have an average return of 7% per year.
The annual interest rate paid to saving accounts by many formal banks in India ranges between 4-10%. As another point of comparison, the nominal yield on ten-year Indian government bonds in 2007 (the year of our survey) was 8.5% (Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish 2012) . Accounting profits from the Kisan calculation suggest that the rate of return from cows and buffaloes are not substantially higher than these low risk financial assets. For cows our return estimates range from -9% to %21, and for buffaloes our estimates range from -38 percent to 20 percent. While both of these ranges include returns that are higher than formal savings products, it is important to note that these ranges are calculated before we include the cost of any labor spent on caring for animals or adjust for the fact that livestock investments are likely more risky than formal financial products (livestock can get sick, die or have problems getting pregnant). Given that labor costs and animal risk are likely to reduce the real returns experienced by households, we argue that it is unlikely that livestock investments offer better returns than formal savings products.
In Tables 3a, 3b , 3c, and 3d we explore the possible impact of labor costs on the estimated returns to Indian dairy animals. As expected, including labor costs drives all of our return estimates to be negative, with the average return to a cow equal to -64% and to a buffalo equal to -39% when calculated with self-reported fodder costs and using the mean animal values (Table   3a) . These large and negative results remain when we adjust for outliers in animal values (Table   3b ), adjust for outliers in fodder costs (Table 3c) , and when we adjust for both outliers in animal values and fodder costs (Table 3d ). While we do not have panel data to allow us to estimate the impact of animal risk on returns, we believe that incorporating animal risk in to our return estimates would also lead to low returns relative to formal savings products. Overall, these results raise an important question: if these estimates are correct and cows and buffaloes are not economically profitable, why do households hold onto these animals instead of selling them?
IV. Potential Explanations
Measurement Error
The first explanation of our finding is the simplest: our data or assumptions on production of cows are wrong. Our estimates ultimately rely on household self-reports on the costs and revenues of dairy animal production, and so if households misstate revenues or costs our findings of low returns might not reflect true returns. Indeed, in Sri Lanka, de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009a) find that firms systematically under-report revenues by about 30% and overreport costs. They conclude that simply asking firms how much profit they make provides a more accurate measure of profits than detailed questions on revenues and expenses.
Previous work in labor economics has found that workers in formal employment settings typically do over-state the amount of hours worked (Bound et al. 1994; Carstensen and Woltman 1979; Duncan and Hill 1985; Hamermesh 1990; Mellow and Sider 1983; Robinson and Bostrom 1994; Stafford and Duncan 1977) . Nonetheless, the fact that we find modest average returns even when we assume that labor costs are zero suggest that over-stating the amount of time spent on dairying is not the sole driver for our low estimated returns.
Preference for Home -Produced Milk
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Indian households believe, and perhaps rightly so, that home produced milk is of higher quality than purchased milk. Reuters (2012) recently reported that much of the country's milk is either diluted or contaminated with chemicals, including bleach, fertilizer or detergents. A government survey also found that 68.4% of milk sold in India does not meet basic health standards (FSSAI 2011) . This implies that households may value homeproduced milk at a rate higher than the market value, and therefore may be willing to receive low financial returns on dairy investments in exchange for the guarantee of having high quality milk available for household consumption. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that only 12% of our sample households actually sold milk in the past year. 15 If the value of self-produced milk was 20% higher than the market price, the average accounting return to cows would rise from negative 6% to a positive 10%. 
Preference for Illiquid Savings
15 There are other potential explanations for why so few households sell milk. Another plausible explanation is that there is limited external demand for the milk produced in our sample villages; only 23% of our sample villages are visited by milk buyers, and only 8% have a milk cooperative. 16 If further evidence showed that households primarily hold low return cows as a way to guarantee clean milk supply, then inspection policies or business innovations (i.e., quality verification markets) that reveal the hidden information in milk markets could be welfare enhancing.
In developing countries, low-income individuals and small businesses are generally excluded from conventional financial institutions (Rutherford 2000) . de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009b) document that few poor households have formal savings accounts. However, as
Rutherford (2000) emphasizes, low income households do typically have some savings. This has led to the proliferation of a variety of forms of semiformal or informal savings channels, including deposit collectors, 17 savings clubs, postal accounts, accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs), rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), or saving at home.
These savings channels may help to meet the needs of the poor by offering convenient services in their neighborhoods (as in the case of deposit collectors), allowing them access to loans (ASCAs and ROSCAs), and providing them with incentives to save (in the form of the social pressure present in savings clubs, ROSCAs and ASCAs).
However, there are also disadvantages associated with these types of informal savings. The use of deposit collectors entails a negative interest rate. Interpersonal conflict or lack of trust may inhibit the creation of savings clubs, ROSCAs and ASCAs, and keeping money in the home offers no shield against inflation, and may lead to temptation spending. In the face of these shortcomings, households may find it desirable to save a portion of their income close to home in illiquid assets such as livestock, even if the returns to this means of saving are low, or even negative.
Labor Market Failures: True Value of Marginal Time is Zero
If labor markets are missing or imperfect, particularly for women 18 , then the true opportunity cost of labor may actually be zero or close to zero (Basu 1997; Dasgupta 1993; Bardhan 1984; Mammen and Paxson 2000) . In many locations, the formal labor market for women is essentially non-existent (Emran and Stiglitz 2006) . Mammen and Paxson (2000) note that "there may be costs associated with women working outside of the domain of the family farm or non-farm family enterprise. Custom and social norms may also limit the ability of women to accept paid employment, especially in manual jobs. Further, off-farm jobs may be less compatible with child rearing, creating fixed costs of working off-farm" (p. 143). This implies that the household 17 In West Africa susu (deposit) collectors are paid up to 40% interest for providing a means of saving for rural households (Rutherford, 2000) . 18 For about half the households analyzed, women are responsible for tending the animals.
optimization treats the female labor endowment as effectively non-traded. One would expect that as the costs of women's time increases as they enter the workforce, the opportunity cost of tending a cow would also rise. However, if there are no opportunities for people to enter the workforce, then the opportunity cost of raising an animal is effectively zero, or at best the value of other home production opportunities.
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Preference for Positive Skewness in Returns
Garrett and Sobel (1999) document theoretical and empirical evidence that positive skewness of prize distributions explains why risk averse individuals may play the lottery. Similarly, skewness of returns distributions may explain why people may hold female cows and buffaloes, given that there is a small probability of making huge profits, although on average the animals yield negative economic returns. Our estimates provide evidence for positive skewness in returns. For example, Table 2a shows that the top 20% cows and buffaloes generated huge profits of 378%
and 322%, respectively. At the same time, the bottom 40% of cows and buffaloes make substantial losses. This is consistent with the model of learning and types of enterprise presented in Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2012) , which predicts that a majority of entrepreneurs will have low marginal returns to capital as they are not capable of running a larger business, but that a small proportion of entrepreneurs may have the skills to run large firms profitably.
Social and Religious Value
In Hinduism, the cow is a symbol of wealth, strength, abundance, selfless giving and a full earthly life. 20 As almost all the sampled households reported that they were Hindu, they may also derive spiritual returns from cattle ownership. The foregone returns compared to their next best investment alternative would effectively be the cost of religiosity in this context. This of course does not explain the results for buffaloes. It also requires believing that the long term social evolution of a religion could find an equilibrium in which individuals worship a loss-inducing investment; most economic models of religion predict that customs derived from religion are either beneficial or strengthen the group, and this seems to do neither (Bainbridge and Iannaccone 2010) .
19 Based on the traditional assumption made in the literature that the value of an individual's time spent in any activity is equal to his or her wage rate. 20 For a general review of the debate on why cows evolved to become holy in Hinduism see Korom (2000) .
V. Further Research Questions and Policy Implications
Our goal here is not to determine conclusively why Indian households invest in cows and buffaloes despite the fact that economic returns to such investments seem to be frequently negative. Our goal, rather, is put forward a puzzle, with the aim to motivate either better data, or better understanding of these markets or behavioral decisions, in order to explain the puzzle.
With a better understanding of the driving market or behavioral failures, if any, one can then focus policies on specific market problems.
Evidence suggests that the poor are often willing to earn negative interest in order to access reliable saving services (see Dupas and Robinson (2012) for evidence on savings accounts with negative interest rates in Kenya and Rutherford (2000) If indeed, as we find, owning cows yields low or negative returns, this is of critical importance for NGO and government programs that promote investment in cows with an aim of poverty alleviation. In particular, the results here are critical for programs that engage in livestock grants to help households start or expand income generating activity from raising livestock (this is common amongst "graduation" programs, cited earlier, as well as many NGOs, such as Heifer
International or other livestock grant programs). Our results suggest that merely transferring an asset alone may not be sufficient to generate higher income (beyond the value of the transferred asset). The heterogeneity in returns we observe may of course be due to heterogeneity in skills and knowledge on how to raise dairy animals profitably; this suggests potential for training and monitoring to improve the returns for households.
Our results are also consistent with the finding in de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009b) that female owned enterprises in Sri Lanka have a marginal return to capital equal to zero.
Fafchamps et al. (2011) also find that the returns to capital are equal to zero for female enterprises with less than the median level of profits prior to the capital infusion. Given that in our context the maintenance of dairy animals is managed by the women and children of the household, a similar mechanism or failure may drive the results in both our analysis and that of de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009b) Buffaloes Cows 0-3 months after giving birth 3-6 months after giving birth 6-9 months after giving birth 9-10 months after giving birth Liters of milk produced per day
